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Abstract 
 
Employer organisations and the literature examining them have transformed since their 
inception in the nineteenth century. We systematically review this literature and the evolving 
role of employer organisations by focussing on the most cited publications of this body of 
academic work. This article provides a synopsis of our current understanding of employer 
organisations, identifies gaps in our knowledge and develops the following argument. 
Employer organisations adapted to changing socio-economic contexts by evolving within and 
across three across three roles – as industrial relations actor, political actor and service 
provider. Historically, employer organisations were predominantly understood as an 
industrial relations actor with collective bargaining as their defining activity. However, 
employer organisations also influenced the political process through lobbying and 
participating in corporatist arrangements, while more recently their provision of member 
services has grown in scope and importance.  
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, employer organisations (EOs) emerged as an industrial relations (IR) actor 
whose primary role was to counter trade unions (Sisson, 1987; Haipeter, 2011; Plowman, 
1988). They progressed to a central role within institutional collective bargaining, regarded 
by the literature as their defining activity. Other collective bodies existed but had no 
bargaining role, and were known as trade organisations (Traxler, 2000). However, economic 
and political changes in recent decades impacted on EOs. Patterns of bargaining became 
increasingly decentralised throughout the developed world, and EOs’ involvement in 
bargaining decreased. Collective employer bodies did not, however, retreat from work and 
employment relations. Their continuing activity within these topics ranged broadly and 
included lobbying governments on related issues and providing human resource management 
(HRM) based services. We broaden the definition of EOs to capture this continuation, 
examining their ongoing role within work and employment relations beyond collective 
bargaining.  
 
EOs and trade unions are employment relationship counterparts but research has focussed 
predominantly on the latter, and EOs have been less researched (Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; 
Bonnett, 1922; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). Nonetheless, a multi-disciplinary body of 
literature exists on EOs, primarily in employment relations and political science, and to a 
lesser extent in the sociology of work, labour economics and business history. We 
systematically review this literature by analysing the most cited academic texts. The article 
synthesizes academic knowledge on EOs, identifies the gaps in the literature and develops 
the following argument to capture their evolution.  
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We argue that since their inception, EOs adapted to changing socio-economic contexts by 
developing within and across three roles – as IR actor, political actor and service provider – 
along with related practices and activities in each. In relation to the first, the literature once 
predominantly understood EOs as an IR actor focussing on collective bargaining. The decline 
of trade unions and economic internationalization contributed to a lessening of the incidence 
of collective bargaining, although trajectories of change varied across liberal and coordinated 
market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001). More recently, some EOs promoted equality and 
diversity working standards by developing codes of conduct and certification, constituting 
private voluntary regulation of the labour market (Demougin, et al., 2019; Bowkett, 
Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2017).  
 
The second role, of political actor, was always present given the political importance of 
employment relations (Crouch, 1993; Martin & Swank, 2008). This role, however, became 
more important in the post-war era as EOs were formally integrated into political economies 
through their involvement in corporatist and tripartite economic governance alongside trade 
unions and the state (Hall, 1989; Scharpf, 1991). Joint governance survived in some countries 
where employers were involved in the governance of national training systems, regulation of 
national insurance or setting minimum wages. However, EOs often lost those channels of 
influence in countries with more liberal trajectories, and strengthened instead their existing 
focus on lobbying (Sheldon et al., 2016).  
 
Finally, EOs have recently evolved in their role as service provider, moving beyond those 
related to collective bargaining to include others such as training, legal services and HRM 
advice. These latter services offer continuing incentives for individual employers to associate 
with EOs (Sheldon et al., 2016; Zhu & Nyland, 2016). However, other studies have identified 
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alternative strategies such as generating new collective goods in the form of promoting 
regional development (Sheldon et al., 2019). 
 
As we discuss in this article, employer collective organisation was hampered by broader 
developments such as: declining government support for collective regulation and economic 
governance; weakening of labour unions; the liberalization of markets; and, economic 
internationalization. However, the ‘strange non-death of employer associations’ (Brandl & 
Lehr, 2016) meant that EOs survived despite adverse conditions by evolving in their roles as 
IR actor, political actor and service provider to maintain relevance to their members. 
 
2: METHODS AND DATA  
 
Our argument is based on a systematic review of the most cited publications on EOs. We 
identified our sample through database searches and an expert survey. We looked for 
variations1 of the term “employer organisation” in four social science databases: Google 
Scholar, Web of Science, Business Source Premier and Scopus. Search terms had to be 
present either in the Title, Abstract or Keywords of the publications. We then identified the 
most cited texts, although Google Scholar citations were required to be higher than for the 
other sources as its counting algorithm draws from more sources. Counts were relaxed for 
older citations as these pre-date internet search engines and have lower citation numbers. 
Citation counts were also relaxed for newer citations as they take time to accumulate after 
publication. We manually excluded all publications that only mentioned EOs in passing. To 
increase the robustness of our sample, we asked academic experts to identify omissions in 
                                                          
1 Each of the following 12 variations were searched for in the databases: “Employer Organisation”, “Employer 
Organization”, “Employers Organisation”, “Employers Organization”, “Employer Organisations”, “Employer 
Organizations”, “Employers Organisations”, “Employers Organizations”, “Employer Association”, “Employer 
Associations”, “Employers Association”, “Employers Associations”.  
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our initial selection of articles. Sixteen academics took part in this survey and helped us to 
identify additional texts.2 The final sample was 131 publications.  
 
We then developed and applied a coding scheme to capture key information from each 
publication. Categories included, for example: type of publication; academic field; theoretical 
topic; research methods; type of analysis; geographical focus; industry focus; and, EO 
activity. We manually coded each text and entered the results into a Microsoft Excel database, 
which enabled us to identify key themes and topics in the study of EOs as well as omissions.  
 
Over half of the publications (55.7%) were journal articles, while around one-fifth were either 
respectively book chapters (21.4%) or books (19.1%). The remainder were conference or 
working papers (2.3%) or other types (1.5%), such as the report of the UK’s Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (1968). Nearly two thirds 
(66.4%) of the most cited publications were from the field of IR and HRM, and almost a 
quarter (23.7%) were from political sciences. Only a small minority of references were from 
(labour) economics (3.1%), sociology (of work) (2.3%), other academic (3.8%) or non-
academic sources (0.8%).  
 
Nearly two thirds (63%) of the sample included some empirical data, whereas the remaining 
publications (37%) were opinion pieces, essays or syntheses. Out of those 82 articles that 
included empirical data, 44% were purely qualitative, 38% were entirely quantitative and 
18% used mixed methods. More specifically, 38% of the 82 empirical publications used 
                                                          
2 We are grateful to the following experts for taking part in our survey: Michael Barry, Martin Behrens, William 
Brown, Thomas Haipeter, Paul Marginson, Georg Menz, Dieter Sadowski, Peter Sheldon, Stephen Silvia, Keith 
Sisson, Peter Swenson, Kathleen Thelen, Louise Thornthwaite, Alessia Vatta, Adrian Wilkinson and Jonathan 
Zeitlin.  
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document analysis with a minority relying on archival research. Thirty-four percent included 
secondary data, 23% used interviews or focus groups, 10% used surveys or questionnaires, 
and only two articles used participatory methods. Sixty-six percent of empirical articles used 
a qualitative approach to data analysis and reporting, whereby 30% used a case study and 
36% were comparative. On the quantitative side, 38 articles used quantitative data analysis, 
from which 71% relied on descriptive statistical analysis and 29% used regression analysis. 
 
The vast majority of publications focused on one or several specific countries (69.9%), while 
9% had a global region focus, such as Europe and Latin America. Thirteen percent were large 
scale comparative studies (e.g. Traxler, Blaschke, & Kittel, 2001; Traxler, 2004), and only 
3.1% focussed on specific regions within countries, such as New South Wales (Plowman, 
1982) or Northern England (McIvor, 1996). Figure 1 outlines the varied country focus of the 
national studies, demonstrating how the study of EOs is biased towards European countries, 
the USA, Australia and Japan, but less is known about EOs elsewhere.  
 
Figure 1: Country focus of articles 
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The most common theoretical focus was interest representation (26%), followed by collective 
bargaining theory (15%), collective action (12%) and Varieties of Capitalism (12%). Finally, 
we collected data on the EO activities that were the main focus of the publications. A clear 
majority (69%) focused primarily on EOs’ activity within collective bargaining, followed by 
lobbying and political representation (36%). Another important focus was services (16%). 
We now explore in more detail the themes identified by our literature review. 
 
3: EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS AS INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTOR 
 
Industrial relations has long been considered EOs’ most important area of activity. Such 
activity centred on collective bargaining, the theme most commonly found within our sample. 
Three sub-themes emerged: EOs as countervailing power to unions; EOs as bargaining 
agents; and, the decentralization and decline of collective bargaining.  
 
3.1 Countervailing power 
 
What induces employers competing against one another in markets to found collective 
organisations? Across various national and historical contexts, our sample’s primary answer 
is that EOs were created as a countervailing force to the labour movement (e.g.: Windmuller 
& Gladstone 1984). Nine per cent of our sample featured a theoretical focus on employer 
power and countervailing power, concentrated within studies examining the origins and early 
developments of EOs (e.g. Plowman 1985; Zeitlin 1991). 
 
EOs protected individual employers faced with emerging trade unions, the threat of strike 
action and pressure to raise wages, with Traxler describing EOs as ‘essentially a built-in 
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response to a high degree of strategic coordination on the part of trade unions’ (1999, p.354). 
The need for protection was felt acutely in competitive industries populated by small firms or 
where a large percentage of overheads comprised labour costs (Paster, 2012). More recent 
work on emerging economies identified a similar pattern, as employer collective action arose 
in response to new and independent labour movements (Benson, Zhu, & Gospel, 2017). 
 
Countervailing trade unionism was pursued by different methods. In the early phase of EOs, 
one common strategy was to suppress the labour movement and defend managerial 
prerogative. Historical accounts attest to the role of EOs in breaking strikes, locking out trade 
unionists, and recruiting strike-breakers often with the cooperation of state authorities (Grant 
and Wallace, 1991). Similar methods continued in countries with weakly institutionalized 
systems of IR, e.g. in Turkey where Islamic EOs resisted trade unionism, even when such 
organisations possessed an Islamic character (Sezer, 2019).  
 
The other countervailing approach used by EOs accepted unions as the legitimate 
representative of workers and managed their influence through collective bargaining. Much 
of the classic post-war IR literature viewed employers’ acceptance of this orientation as a key 
indicator of system maturation. This rather teleological interpretation of employer behaviour, 
however, warrants two qualifications. First, the transition towards accommodation was often 
the product of state intervention, as governments required EOs to recognize and deal with 
unions. Plowman’s (1989) account of the emergence of EOs in Australia, for example, 
identified the government’s creation of the Arbitration Act 1906 as a key stimulus, while even 
in the voluntarist UK government played an active role in encouraging employers to associate 
and bargain collectively in the early twentieth century (Clegg, 1979; Howell, 2005). The other 
qualification is that EOs in many countries weakened their commitment to accommodate the 
 
9 
 
labour movement. Rather than a once and for all transition, representing a decisive step 
towards mature IR, the shift from suppression to accommodation in employer behaviour 
should be therefore viewed as contingent, capable of being reversed. 
 
In many developed economies, the labour movement’s loss of power reduced the imperative 
for employers to act collectively, as noted by countervailing power theorists (Barry & 
Wilkinson, 2011). As the union movement declined, it was partially supplanted by other 
countervailing power forces, providing a fresh impetus for collective employer organisation 
(Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2019). Two such forces were the increasing juridification 
of the labour market through individual rights legislation (O’Sullivan et al., 2015), and the 
emergence of identity-based social movements grounded in gender, ethnicity, disability and 
sexuality which pressured employers to develop equality and diversity policies. We traced 
how these forces impacted on employers, leading to new collective organisations, employer 
forums, which mediated employment law and formulated good practice in the management 
of gender, ethnicity, disability and other characteristics for their members (Bowkett et al., 
2017; Demougin et al., 2019, Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2019). Such employer 
bodies carried out voluntary regulation within a broader ‘regulatory state’ that seeks to steer 
business behaviour through a mix of hard and soft regulations (Moran, 2002).  
 
3.2 Collective bargaining 
 
The quintessential activity associated with traditional EOs was multi-employer collective 
bargaining (Sisson, 1987; Haipeter, 2011; Plowman, 1988), considered by a majority (68%) 
of our sample. The following themes were apparent in the literature: the benefits of multi-
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employer bargaining for members of EOs; the variable forms that multi-employer bargaining 
assumes; and, the wider economic and social impacts of such bargaining. 
 
One of the main benefits of multi-employer bargaining was to “neutralize the workplace” 
(Sisson, 1987) by directing union pressure away from individual businesses, thereby 
supporting management prerogative. Specifically, bargaining could protect against wildcat 
strikes, union whipsawing and upward wage pressure (Hauptmeier, 2011). Researchers also 
noted that multi-employer bargaining could control interfirm competition, taking wages out 
of competition and reducing the threats posed both by low-cost entrants into product markets 
and of poaching of skilled labour by more profitable firms (Swenson, 1991). Others observed 
that the benefits of multi-employer bargaining were spread unevenly across EO memberships 
(Thelen, 2000). Research noted that large employers in Germany were the primary 
beneficiaries of multi-employer agreements as wage increases were tied to average 
productivity increases by industry, making wage settlements more affordable to larger 
businesses with high rates of productivity increase (Thelen, 2000).  
 
The literature also highlighted how multi-employer bargaining varied but often conformed to 
distinct national patterns, identifying the level and centralization of collective bargaining as 
key indicators of variation (Traxler, 2000). In one pattern, seen in post-war Nordic countries 
and Austria, bargaining was centralized nationally as agreements were negotiated by the peak 
organisations of industry and labour to provide economy-wide regulation of the labour-
market (Johnston, 1981; Swenson, 2000). A second pattern in Germany saw multi-employer 
bargaining conducted primarily at an industry-level, albeit with agreements in key export 
industries providing a benchmark to be followed by other sectors (Streeck, 1997).  
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A third, mixed, pattern combined national and industry agreements. In post-war Italy, 
Belgium and France national agreements were used to determine broad issues such as hours 
of work while industry or enterprise agreements dealt with other topics (Traxler, 1998). 
Another pattern of ‘coordinated bargaining’ existed in Japan where agreements were 
concluded at enterprise level, but EO coordination ensured that similar agreements were 
signed within a particular industry (Sako, 1997). Finally, although while national patterns can 
be identified, within-country variation existed. Collective bargaining coverage was often 
higher in the public sectors than the private sector, while manufacturing sectors tended to 
have a higher coverage than service sectors (e.g. Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2019).  
 
A final theme in the literature on EOs as bargaining agents addressed the economic and social 
effects of multi-employer bargaining. A much examined topic was how varying degrees of 
collective bargaining centralization affected economic performance (Traxler, 2000). Initial 
research identified that countries with highly centralized or decentralized collective 
bargaining systems outperformed systems that were neither fully centralized nor 
decentralized (Calmfors & Driffill, 1988). Stronger economic performance was attributed to 
either the positive effects of flexible labour markets or corporatist wage setting, although the 
positive effects of collective bargaining was also debated. An economic critique was that 
collective bargaining led to labour misallocation and attendant inefficiencies, whilst IR 
scholars identified positive social outcomes such as reduced income inequality and a lower 
gender wage-gap (Rubery, Grimshaw, & Figueiredo, 2005). 
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3.3 Decentralization and decline of collective bargaining  
 
The decline and decentralization of collective bargaining has been examined across, in 
particular the nature and extent of such change processes; the role EOs played in the decline 
and decentralization of collective bargaining; and, how change affected the relationship 
between EOs and their members.  
 
An important indicator of collective bargaining’s decline was the decreasing coverage of 
collective agreements. Coverage peaked in the post-World War II decades at different points 
depending on the country, but subsequently the number of people whose wages and working 
conditions were so determined decreased. In some liberal market economies such as the USA 
and UK, the erosion of multi-employer bargaining progressed the furthest and industry 
agreements disappeared from most private sector industries. A different pattern existed in 
coordinated market economies such as Germany where multi-employer bargaining remained 
in many industries although its scope reduced. The decline of collective bargaining was 
marginal only in some Nordic economies, where most workers remained covered by 
collective bargaining. A correspondent change process to the decline of collective bargaining 
was decentralization, as bargaining issues moved to lower levels. Katz (1993) examined 
decentralization across liberal and coordinated market economies and identified the growth 
of plant and company level collective bargaining.  
 
In pursuing changes to collective bargaining, EOs adapted to common trends across countries. 
The internationalization of the economy weakened trade unions, and the need for employers 
to contain unions through collective bargaining decreased. At the same time, increased market 
competition required greater flexibility in organising employment relations and work systems 
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(Katz 1993). Traxler’s (1995) differentiation between coordinated and uncoordinated 
decentralization is helpful for mapping the varying EO strategies. In countries with 
uncoordinated decentralization such as the USA, UK and New Zealand, EOs pursued greater 
flexibility by simply exiting multi-employer bargaining and wage-setting moved to the 
company or firm level without coordination across companies (Gooberman, Hauptmeier & 
Heery, 2019).  
 
EOs also sought greater flexibility in countries with more coordinated employment relations 
but did so without leaving multi-employer bargaining, thus ensuring coordinated 
decentralization. Although bargaining took place at company and firm level, EOs negotiated 
some aspects at higher levels, limited variation at the company level or kept some control 
over which bargaining contents moved to company levels. For example, new opening clauses 
allowed employers to deviate from higher-level bargaining contracts if required by economic 
circumstances, but EOs and unions had to agree to individual derogations from collective 
agreements (Ellguth & Kohaut, 2010). However, coordinated decentralization did not entirely 
stop the decline of collective bargaining, although the pace of such decline substantially 
varied across countries and the erosion and hallowing out of collective bargaining were 
central themes in the literature (Hassel, 2009).  
 
Bargaining changes also impacted on the relationships between EOs and their members. 
Given the centrality of collective bargaining and trade unions, it is unsurprising that their 
decline raised members’ questions about the relevance of EOs. An increasing number of 
employers left EOs to unilaterally organise employment relations and work. In some contexts, 
this corresponded to the growth of large firms that had the capacity to develop enterprise-
specific HRM systems (Gospel, 1992). To counter such developments EOs created new 
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member categories to respond to membership demands. For example, Behrens and Helfen 
(2019) described how German EOs introduced new ‘bargaining-free’ membership, offering 
a membership category to employers interested only in political representation and service 
provision but without the obligation to adhere to collective bargaining agreements.  
 
Overall, the capacity of EOs to negotiate, implement and enforce collective bargaining 
standards decreased and only a few coordinated countries avoided this dynamic. Otherwise, 
the elements described above contributed to a partial ‘disorganization’ of EOs as a collective 
IR actor and the demise of institutional IR (Lash & Urry, 1987; Purcell, 1995). EOs 
compensated for the decline of their main function through redefining their role as political 
actor and expanding the provision of services, to which we turn in the next two sections.  
 
4: EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS AS POLITICAL ACTOR  
 
EOs also became an important actor through lobbying and representation in the political 
system, and 36% of publications in our sample (the second highest thematic proportion) dealt 
in some form with this topic. The literature had two main themes. One was how EOs 
represented member interest in the political system. The other was how the comparative 
capitalism literature examined the role of EOs in different types of capitalism, focussing on 
their roles within economic governance and their contributions to economic performance.  
 
4.1 Interest representation in the political system  
 
Twenty-six per cent of our sample had some theoretical focus on interest representation. 
Analytical foci included: the role of EOs during the origins and development of political 
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systems; corporatist or pluralist modes of interest representation; and, different logics of EO 
representation in the political process.  
 
To some extent, EOs’ interaction with trade unions always had a political dimension. When 
the labour movement swelled during the industrial revolution, the responses by EOs and state 
shaped the characteristics of the political system and the associated role of interest groups 
(Crouch, 1993; Martin & Swank, 2008). For example, the German government aimed to stifle 
the upward trajectory of trade unions at the end of the 19th century by addressing some social 
demands. The government founded pension, unemployment and health insurance schemes 
and involved EOs and unions in their governance and administration (Marks, 2014). In the 
UK by contrast, governments sought to confine the role of EOs and unions to the sphere of 
IR. Beyond such differences, a common pattern across countries was that newly founded 
labour parties had direct links to labour movements but EOs were less likely to be directly 
associated with political parties (Oechslin, 1982).  
 
Following these early developments, further watershed moments were World Wars I and II. 
EOs and unions followed the call by governments to take part in the war effort to maximise 
industrial production (Paster, 2012; Flanders, 1974). Such activities upgraded the role of EOs 
and unions, particularly important for the latter as they continued to struggle for legitimacy 
within the political system (Lichtenstein, 1995). This had implications for post-war decades, 
when EOs faced unions that were more established in national political economies.  
 
The post-World War II decades were fertile ground for corporatist policy-making. 
Corporatism refers to the state’s formal integration of interest groups into the political system 
(Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Hereby, the state entrusts policy-making authority to interest 
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groups such as EOs and trade unions, but groups contribute in return to the governance and 
administration of policy areas (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). Keynesianism became the 
dominant paradigm in many Western industrialized countries and it stipulated a role for EOs 
and unions in macro-economic policy making (Hall, 1989). State, EOs and unions engaged 
in tripartite co-operation with the aim to balance and coordinate policies including income, 
inflation and unemployment (Scharpf, 1991). Many EOs and unions became central actors in 
national training regimes, participating in the development of apprenticeship and other 
training programmes and their subsequent administration. In some countries, EOs and unions 
were closely associated with the development of the welfare state. Such association was 
particularly marked in the Ghent countries where trade unions were largely responsible for 
welfare payments such as unemployment benefits, and this role contributed to high 
membership levels in trade unions and EOs (Western, 1997).  
 
However, from the 1980s the emerging neoliberal economic paradigm advocated free markets 
without interference from EOs and trade unions. In a number of liberal market economies, 
governments curtailed the corporatist role of trade unions and EOs. Yet, despite some 
changes, corporatist institutions and policy making remained more entrenched in coordinated 
economies. This process also included the revival of social pacts in some European countries 
in the 1990s and 2000s to increase economic competitiveness and fight unemployment 
(Hassel, 2009). Similar corporatist co-operation existed in the wake of the economic and 
financial crisis in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where EOs, unions and state co-
operated in dealing with the economic and social consequences (Eichhorst & Weishaupt, 
2013). Finally, the International Organisations of Employers represented the interests of 
employers in the context of the tripartite International Labour Organisation (Oechslin, 2001). 
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Pluralism is a distinct analytical account that captures the role of interest groups such as EOs 
in the political system (Grant & Marsh, 1977). Interest groups do not generally participate in 
the administration and governance of political institutions, but instead seek to influence 
policies through lobbying and formal representation in parliament. Pluralism accounted for 
the role of EOs in countries with limited or no tradition of corporatist policy making such as 
the USA (Dahl, 2005). It also captured the changing role of EOs in countries where tripartite 
policy making declined in the wake of neoliberal economic reforms, but developed more 
towards a pluralist political system (Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2019).  
 
In many countries, the boundaries between pluralist and corporatist accounts of EOs blurred 
and overlapped. For example, Sheldon and Thornthwaite (2003) described how EOs in 
Australia were involved in policy-making, implementation and evaluation (p. 243) within a 
political system that generally leant more towards the pluralist spectrum, while EO lobbying 
increased and became more pronounced in countries with a tradition of corporatist policy 
making. Beyond influencing national governments, employers founded international EOs that 
targeted international inter-governmental organisations (Traxler, 1999). For example, 
European and international EOs lobbied the Commission and Parliament of the European 
Union, but literature on international EOs is sparse. 
 
Another influential account for modelling the role of EOs in the political system is Schmitter 
and Streeck’s (1999: 19-24) logics model. This model was widely applied in the literature but 
applications often focussed on two logics of interest representation, ‘membership’ and 
‘influence’ (e.g. Schneider & Grote, 2006, Behrens, 2017). Generally, tensions exist between 
these two logics implying that EOs need to balance their relationship with members against 
the outward representation in the political system. For example, to gain access to influence 
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political authorities, an EO must make commitments, agree to compromise and represent 
themselves in a fashion that might not be fully compatible with the immediate interests and 
demands of the membership. While most of the EO literature has focussed on the ‘two logics’, 
this is an abridged version as Schmitter and Streeck (1999) also discussed the logics of 
‘effective implementation’ and ‘goal formation’ (see also Child, Loveridge, & Warner, 1973). 
Respectively, they focused on the capacity of EOs to implement policies and negotiated 
agreements and the processes through which EOs develop their aims.  
 
4.2 Comparative capitalism 
 
The comparative capitalism literature (with 12% of our sample focusing on such theoretical 
approaches) examined how EOs and other associations contribute to the functioning and 
economic performance of different models of capitalism. A more recent focus was the role of 
EOs in processes of institutional change and labour market dualization. This literature built 
on the corporatist literature discussed above and grew in prominence since the 1990s. A core 
assumption was that EOs and other economic actors were embedded within a national 
institutional context that crucially shaped their behaviour. Streeck’s (1997) argument 
suggested that EOs did not necessarily voluntarily take part in collective economic 
governance and employment relations, but rather that institutions placed ‘beneficial 
constraints’ on them. These institutional obligations ensured that employers take part in 
positive sum collective coordination, which can contribute to economic performance of the 
economy.  
The differing roles of EOs across countries was highlighted by Hall and Soskice’s (2001) 
distinction between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. Their 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ framework suggested that economic governance systematically 
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varied across both types of capitalism. Governance by markets existed across both types, but 
coordinated market economies also used non-market coordination such as governance by 
association from EOs. Thus, EOs played a central role in governing economic activity in 
coordinated market economies through their involvement in collective bargaining, national 
training regimes, welfare states and other forms of tripartite cooperation. Whereas EOs in 
liberal market economy primarily focused on service provision but had only a marginal role 
in economic governance (Martin & Swank, 2012).  
 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) framework challenged globalization arguments suggesting that 
liberal economies were economically superior and coordinated market economies would have 
to liberalize to retain international competitiveness. In contrast, Hall and Soskice argued that 
both types of capitalism could perform well under globalization but that they did so 
differently. Liberal market economies benefited from dynamic and competitive markets in 
sectors requiring radical innovation. However, in coordinated market economies social and 
collective institutions that often incorporated EOs in their governance underpinned 
performance where incremental innovation and long-term business strategies were needed. 
Following Hall and Soskice, the literature explored further types of capitalism such as mixed 
market economies (e.g. Italy and Spain), Nordic capitalism, and hierarchical market 
economies in Latin America (Kristensen & Lilja, 2011; Molina & Rhodes, 2007; Schneider, 
2009). As in the above discussed argument by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), the countries on 
both ends of the spectrum tended to outperform the mixed cases. 
 
However, the inclination of the Varieties of Capitalism literature to depict economies as 
coherent national models came under pressure through empirical anomalies (Vidal & 
Hauptmeier, 2014). These included the decline of EOs, trade unions and collective bargaining 
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coverage as discussed above, but also the growing number of low wage or precarious workers, 
which challenged the image of coordinated market economies. Moving beyond such 
coherence of national models, two streams in the literature examined these changes within 
national economies: the institutional change and the dualization literatures.  
 
Researchers focussing on institutional change attempted to capture the transformation and 
liberalization of different national models. This literature did not see EOs and other actors as 
passive recipients of institutional effects, emphasizing instead the capacity of actors to 
proactively change institutions. Baccaro and Howell (2017) forcefully elaborated this point 
in their analysis of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden since the 1970s. They argued 
that an expansion of employer discretion took place across all countries, i.e. a “greater 
influence and control of individual employers over wage determination, hiring and firing and 
the organization of the workplace” (2017, 1). Initially, the power of trade unions and other 
institutional constraints limited employer discretion; however, employers increasingly 
bypassed or ignored institutions in the later periods of their inquiry. Employers first-order 
preference was to liberalize employment relations and they pursued their “dormant wish” 
once the political opportunity structure changed (Ibsen et al., 2011). Employers simply 
weakened existing institutions through exit as individual employers left EOs, or EOs ceased 
to conduct collective bargaining. These changes were uneven but greater liberalization and 
employer discretion could be observed across all countries. Other authors such as Thelen 
(2014) saw efforts to liberalize coordinated market economies as more limited and stressed 
the continuing interests of employers to maintain collective and social institutions.  
The dualization literature offered possibilities to fuse both sides of the debate to capture the 
parallel processes of liberalization and coordination (Emenegger et al., 2012). For example, 
core parts of the German economy followed the typical pattern of coordination between firms, 
 
21 
 
EOs and labour representatives at different levels, while at the same time low value added 
work was outsourced and service sector work liberalized (Hassel, 2014). This labour market 
dualization was explained by ‘producer coalitions’ between core workers, employers and 
their collective representatives, EOs and trade unions, which had the political and economic 
strength to maintain core institutions, often in manufacturing sectors; while service sector 
workers and lower segments of the labour market lacked supporting coalitions to prevent 
deregulation and liberalization. Producer coalitions in the German economy focussed on 
increasing productivity through coordination and cooperation when under economic pressure, 
whereas low wage and service sector workers faced blunter labour cost cutting measures and 
deterioration of working standards. Overall, EOs retain an important role within comparative 
capitalist research, but debate continues as to how capitalist economies evolve.  
 
5: EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS AS SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
Another, more recent strand of research emerged to explain how EOs survived through 
adapting and expanding their service offered to members. Although only 16% of our sample 
focused on such activity, it emerged recently as an important area of study (e.g.: Gooberman, 
Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2017, 2018a; Sheldon et al., 2016; Ibsen and Navrbjerg, 2019). Such 
research often built on Olson’s (1965) classic formulation of the collective action problem, 
the theoretical focus of 12% of our sample. This formulation predicted that self-interested 
firms and individuals would not act collectively due to the ‘free rider’ problem that emerged 
when organisations lobbied successfully for the creation of public goods such as collective 
agreements or regulation. As such goods were available to all, rational actors would not 
commit resources to collective groups as these goods could be obtained at no cost. Olson’s 
theory implies that collective action is unlikely to occur in the absence of state-driven 
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encouragement or compulsion to join EOs. However, one way to overcome the problem and 
the threat it faces to organisational survival is through offering services. These were often 
offered as either or both selective and elective services, with the former making membership 
more attractive to new and existing members and the latter enabling EOs to obtain resources 
(Sheldon et al., 2019).  
 
Although consistent cross-national data on the type and volume of services provided by EOs 
to individual members were not available, some broad trends were identified by country-
specific studies. Ibsen and Navrbjerg (2018) analysed Danish EOs, collecting data on 12 types 
of HRM related services, such as employment law helplines or advice on topics including 
equality and diversity, employee engagement and managing conflict. EOs on average offered 
between 50 and 60 per cent of these depending on their size, with larger EOs offering higher 
levels (2019: 8). In Germany, the gradual erosion of collective bargaining (Streeck, 2009) 
spurred some EOs to respond with a greater emphasis on services (Silvia & Schroeder, 2007). 
Finally, the importance of service provision has been noted outside more developed 
economies. For example, Zhu and Nyland (2017) argued that the Chinese Employers 
Confederation was able to recruit members’ in part due to its provision of HRM consultancy 
services.  
 
While comparative studies are largely absent from the literature, it appears that EOs in 
countries with more decentralized employment relations systems may be offering a greater 
volume of selective and elective services. For example, studies of Australian EOs (You and 
Barry, 2016; Sheldon et al., 2016) argued that they faced threats to their financial 
sustainability, producing responses prioritising commercial over associational objectives.  
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Some EOs raised revenue by offering elective goods such as commercially-priced, expert 
services to non-members, often discounting the same services to their members on a selective 
basis (Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 2004). While EOs had long provided some selective goods 
such as information on industry trends and advice on regulatory compliance, these were 
joined by more commercial activities available on an elective basis including those relating 
to HRM. As an example, the New South Wales Business Chamber offered five member types 
with the more expensive offering greater access to services such as legal compliance (Sheldon 
et al., 2016). In the UK, Gooberman, Hauptmeier and Heery (2017) identified 447 EOs. Few 
remained active in collective bargaining, but all generally provided a broad range of selective 
and elective services across HRM and business development.  
 
One set of explanations for the shift towards service provision focused on how organisational 
adaptation and innovation drove a service based model that enabled EOs to survive declines 
in collective bargaining. Some scholars developed this approach further by analysing EOs as 
entities seeking to survive in a competitive commercial environment. Sheldon et al. (2016) 
used strategic choice and resource dependency frameworks to analyse Australian EOs. They 
argued that organisations facing environmental threats to financial sustainability, such as 
decentralisation that increased exposure to competition, often responded by prioritizing 
commercial over associational objectives. The importance of commercial stimuli, such as 
intra-industry competition, in driving change was also highlighted by You and Barry’s (2016) 
study of Australian retail EOs. Finally, Ibsen and Navrbjerg (2018) used functional and 
structural adaptation (Traxler, 2004) to explain change in Danish EOs, finding that they 
layered new services onto traditional collective functions. Layering was driven by changes 
within employment relations, and although survival was linked to the continuation of some 
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collective approaches, the provision of such goods within bargaining was insufficient to 
ensure EOs’ survival and they were forced to offer new services to individual firms.  
 
Although our review suggests that EOs are increasingly focused on service provision (e.g. 
Sheldon and Thornthwaite 2004; Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2018), the service-based 
hypothesis has to be qualified with two caveats. One is that the trajectories of such shifts 
varied widely due to differing national institutional contexts. The other is that the provision 
of selective and elective goods is not the only response to changing external circumstances, 
as some EOs have developed new collective goods. For example, Sheldon et al. (2019) drew 
on meta-organisational and resource based views to argue that difficulties in competing with 
commercial providers within service provision has led to successful attempts by Italian and 
Australian territorial EOs to develop new collective goods. These goods shifted the focus of 
these territorial EOs away from bargaining leadership towards promoting regional economic 
development. 
 
6: CONCLUSION  
 
EOs’ main functions were once to counter trade union power and conduct collective 
bargaining, but the decline of these institutions raised concerns as to the continued existence 
of EOs. However, researchers pointed to the ‘strange non-death of employer associations’ 
(Brandl & Lehr, 2016) to debate the continuing relevance of EOs (Ibsen & Navrbjerg, 2019; 
Sezer, 2019). This article contributed to this debate by arguing that EOs adapted to changing 
socio-economic contexts by evolving within and across three roles – as an industrial relations 
actor, a political actor and a service provider. Beyond their previous bargaining role, some 
EOs promoted higher working standards in the area of equality and diversity through codes 
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of conduct and certification, which are forms of private voluntary regulation of the labour 
market (Demougin, et al., 2019; Bowkett, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2017). EOs also expanded 
political representation and lobbying by influencing labour and employment legislation. 
Finally, EOs widened the provision of services to include legal services, training and 
development, and HRM advice. However, some EOs also promoted regional development 
and economic growth, which collectively benefitted members and non-members (Sheldon et 
al., 2019). 
 
We highlight how Traxler’s (1995) differentiation between coordinated and uncoordinated 
decentralization helps map EO strategies. In countries with uncoordinated decentralization, 
EOs exited multi-employer bargaining and wage-setting moved to the individual company or 
firm. In these countries, EOs were likely to be more advanced in evolving their roles as 
political actors and service providers. In countries with more coordinated employment 
relations, EOs still sought greater flexibility. However, they did not necessarily leave multi-
employer bargaining, instead often adopting approaches that delegated some aspects of 
bargaining to company level but retained others (Ellguth & Kohaut, 2010). The partial 
retention of institutional IR meant that there was less pressure on EOs to evolve as political 
actors and service providers although evolution did take place (Ibsen and Navrbjerg, 2018). 
Despite such differentiation, patterns varied considerably by country depending on specific 
institutional and political circumstances.  
 
The study of EOs is less voluminous compared to that on trade unions, but the literature within 
employment relations, political science, the sociology of work and labour economics allows 
to trace and map the changing roles of EOs and identify processes of decline and revival. 
Nonetheless, we identify five gaps that could be addressed by future research. The first is the 
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lack of research on EO members meaning that we know little about why employers join EOs. 
The functions of EOs may well correspond with employer interests (Mares, 2003), but 
empirical quantitative or qualitative research focussing on individual employers might 
identify additional interests. Second, there are indications that some EOs target international 
governmental organisations, such as the European Union and the International Labour 
Organization. Literature exists on the politics of such organisations, but research that focuses 
on employer interest representation in the context of these and other international bodies is 
sparse.  
 
Third, some articles point to increasing EO political representation and lobbying at national 
levels but detailed analysis is largely absent. Elite research is difficult (Mills, 2000), but future 
research could unpack activities and channels used by EOs to influence policy. Fourth, most 
of the English language research focusses on a small number of countries, such as European 
states, the USA, Japan and Australia (see Figure 1). However, we know little about EOs in 
other countries, although an important recent exception is Benson, Zhu and Gospel’s (2017) 
edited volume on EOs in Asia. Fifth, little research exists on the internal governance of EOs, 
although indications exist that some EOs moved away from democratic governance towards 
unilateral delivery of services without member input. EOs also seem less capable of 
implementing and enforcing collective standards vis-à-vis their members. Such questions of 
internal governance have yet to be explored systematically by empirical research.  
 
In conclusion, EOs have been central actors in employment relations and national political 
systems, as governments sanctioned and supported them through: informal guidance and 
administrative rulings in voluntarist systems (Howell, 2005); the creation of new political and 
IR institutions; and, their integration in tripartite governance structures. However, state 
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support for EOs has weakened since the 1980s although the intensity of these processes varied 
between countries. EOs attempted to compensate for their declining role by expanding 
political representation and service provision. However, it is unlikely that internal renewal 
strategies are sufficient for EOs to return to their previous influence and organisational 
strength. Such a return seems possible only with new forms of state support and delegations 
of authority to EOs. These forms of state action are less common but do occur, e.g. the 
German government delegated the authority to set the newly introduced minimum wages to 
EOs and unions in 2015, providing both actors with a new purpose in a context of declining 
collective bargaining (Bosch, 2018). The “strange non-death” of EOs is a continuing 
phenomenon, but one that may yet lead in unexpected directions. 
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